Jon Tetreault

Writing · November 2026

The warning came three hours late.

On November 8, attackers drained a Lightning wallet server for more than three hours before its maintainers said a word. Then the project told every operator to turn their servers off. Here is what the reporting confirms, what nobody has published, and the habit that matters.

What the sources agree on

LNbits is open-source software for running Lightning wallets and payment services. On November 8, at about 12:33 UTC, the project told operators using its Paywall extension to disable it while it looked into a possible bug. About 80 minutes later it went further: The Hacker News reports the project told all operators to shut their LNbits servers down after a wave of attacks, and said it had security patches to push. TFTC and Bitcoin.com News put the shutdown notice at about 13:56 UTC. The hosted service at my.lnbits.com was suspended too, with a return promised within 24 hours of fixes.

The one quantified loss comes from Kevin Ravensberg, who runs the server behind BitTipBot, a Telegram tipping bot. He reported that new accounts withdrew 2,285,545 satoshis, about 0.023 BTC, between 09:22 and 14:00 UTC. That means the drain began more than three hours before the first public warning. He has promised to repay BitTipBot users out of his own pocket. Per TFTC, that promise is voluntary, not insured, and funds stay frozen until a patch ships.

What nobody has said

No outlet I read names the vulnerable extension. Ravensberg says LNbits developer Ben Arc and security testers confirmed which one hit his server, but it hasn't been made public, and no one has confirmed it is Paywall. As of the reports I read, dated November 8 and 9, no fixed version was out. Arc estimated 24 to 48 hours for patches. Nobody has said how many servers were hit or what the total loss is. Ravensberg's figure is the only one.

The sources also don't line up on timing. The drain window runs to 14:00 UTC, but the shutdown notice is reported at 13:53 to 13:56. The articles don't reconcile that, and I won't guess. TFTC adds that the attacks appear to target account-management and withdrawal functions, not the underlying Lightning nodes. It also notes an earlier outside audit, and says no link between those findings and this attack has been established. TFTC's view that this shows an architectural problem with modular, internet-facing deployments is opinion, and it says itself the post-mortem could point to something operational instead.

What this is not

It isn't a break in Bitcoin or in Lightning. Based on what's published, it is a flaw in wallet-server software that holds balances for other people. That's an old category of failure. The money sat in an application with accounts, an API, and add-ons, and someone found a way to ask it for withdrawals.

What I'd do

If you run a wallet or payment server, treat it like a cash drawer, not a safe. A drawer holds what the shift needs. You count it, you empty it into the safe on a schedule, and you know where the shutoff is. Concretely:

Keep the balance small. Sweep anything you don't need for the next few days to a key the server can't touch.

Know your off switch. Before the next incident, decide who can stop the server and how fast. A warning that lands three hours late is useless if your shutdown takes another hour.

Follow the project's security channel. The shutdown order went out on X. If you only learn about this a day later, you lose.

Cut what you don't use. Every extension you leave on is code with access to funds. Ravensberg's attackers created new accounts. If your server doesn't need open sign-ups, closing them is cheap. That one is my own hardening habit, not a claim from the sources.

If you're a user of someone else's LNbits-backed service, your balance is that operator's promise. Keep only spending money there.

The boring conclusion

The patch will come and the post-mortem will name the extension. What will still be true is that funds sitting in a live application are exposed to whatever that application gets wrong. Check the project's own channels for the patch and the write-up before you turn anything back on.

Verify everything, especially the server that holds other people's money.

— Jon Tetreault, November 2026. The habits, tools, and checks behind this piece are what I teach in Crypto Security Mastery.